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Abstract. Search engines are key to ﬁnding information on the web. Search presently is free for
users – ﬁnanced by targeted advertisement. Today, the current search terms determine the ad
placement. In the near future, search engine providers will make use of detailed user proﬁles for
better ad placement. This puts user privacy at risk. Anonymizing search histories, which is a
solution in principle, gives way to a trade oﬀ between privacy and the usability of the data for ad
placement. This paper studies this tradeoﬀ systematically. To this end, we implement an algorithm
for the anonymization of search histories which is ﬂexible regarding the target function. It can
retain frequent terms or terms where corresponding ads are clicked with a high probability, keep up
the number of users it can derive interests for, etc. We quantify the usefulness of the anonymized
log for ad placement in a broad way, e.g., by estimating the number of ad clicks or of ad impressions,
based on marketing data from Yahoo! As a result, anonymized search logs are still useful for ad
placement, but this very much depends on the target function.
1 Introduction
Advertising is the main source of revenue of search-engine providers (providers in what
follows), so that search engines are available without charging users explicitly. More speciﬁ-
cally, ad placement tries to predict the user intent, i.e., the current information need of the
user, in order to display ads of interest. Revenue depends on prediction quality. To improve
ad placement, providers are about to rely on search logs; their privacy policies indicate that
they are ready and willing to do so.1
∗Note: A four page abstract of this work appears in Proceedings of CIKM 2010. This submission contains
substantial additional detail throughout, particularly in details of data analysis and experiments.
1http://www.google.co.uk/intl/en/privacy˙cookies.html, Nov. 2009; http://privacy.microsoft.
com, Jan. 2010; http://privacy.yahoo.com, Jan. 2010.
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The public release of search logs by AOL in 2006 has shown (inadvertently) that query
histories, i.e., sets of queries assigned to an individual according to his search engine account,
cookies or the IP address, are individually identiﬁable information [1,2]. The European
Commission has taken this perspective as well [3]. In other words, storing and processing
personal data has the important drawback that user privacy is at risk.
When processing and storing personal information, providers face obligations from data-
protection law. Most of these obligations are diﬃcult and expensive to comply with. In
cases where providers have failed to fulﬁll obligations, this frequently has lead to negative
publicity. Such obligations include requesting consent, informing individuals, going through
complex processes to delete data, etc. [3,4].
One way to ensure user privacy is anonymization. Use of anonymized search histories would
not only improve user privacy, it would also free providers from those regulatory obligations.
According to [4], a data set is anonymous if a person cannot be individually identiﬁed. [5]
has deﬁned anonymity for set-valued data. We refer to this notion as (k,m)-Anonymity:
each combination of m terms out of a search history of a particular user is in the history of
k − 1 other users as well. The party anonymizing the log can decide on the number m of
attributes forming a potential identiﬁer. We use their deﬁnition in this paper.
Example 1: [6,7] has shown that about 67% of the US citizens can be identiﬁed by {date of
birth, zip, gender}. Setting m = 3 when anonymizing the data would prevent this re identiﬁcation,
by guaranteeing that each combination of three attribute values exists at least k times.
The higher m, the larger the number of attributes an adversary would need to re-identify
an individual. The higher k, the more users are indistinguishable from each other.
Using other deﬁnitions of anonymity [8–10] instead would not solve the problem, as we will
explain in Section 2.3. Analogously, anonymization techniques that rely on generalization [5,
11] or insertion of queries [12] are not applicable in our setting as well, as we will show. To
achieve (k,m)-Anonymity, we will delete terms from the individual histories of users until
the deﬁnition of anonymity is met.
We are not aware of any study where search-log anonymization according to (k,m)-An-
onymity is accomplished by deleting terms. While, on a technical level, this is relatively
easy to accomplish, the characteristics of the anonymization results are much less clear:
Inherent to anonymization is a tradeoﬀ between privacy and the quality of the anonymized
data [13,14], in our case the usefulness for ad placement. There are several ways to achieve
the same level of anonymity for a log. Existing work on anonymization [5,11,13] proposes
anonymization algorithms and studies their eﬀectiveness. Each optimizes towards a single
generic target, e.g., the number of generalizations of terms required, or the log size after
anonymization. This is somewhat undiﬀerentiated. For instance, the “optimal” anonymized
log could vary for diﬀerent business models of providers, e.g., pay-per-impressions, pay-per-
clicks. Alternatively, as advertisers may have diﬀerent advertising strategies as well [15],
“optimal” might refer to, e.g., bidding on speciﬁc but expensive terms, bidding on cheap
general ones, etc. This indicates that targeting at diﬀerent characteristics of the log during
anonymization will lead to results with quite diﬀerent degrees of usability for advertisement.
Example 2: Based on the data we will use in our evaluation, we have measured the correlation
of (i) the frequency of a term in the search log and (ii) the maximum bid Yahoo! recommends
advertisers for the term. We have not found any signiﬁcant correlation. This means that trying to
keep as many frequent terms as possible during optimization will result in a log that may or may
not contain many terms advertisers bid highly for.
Thus, anonymization should be ﬂexible regarding the target function. Accordingly, to
anonymize data in an optimal way, it is important to study the eﬀects of diﬀerent target
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functions systematically.
Problem Statement Assume we are given levels of privacy and diﬀerent target functions
optimizing diﬀerent characteristics of the anonymization result. We ask, is there a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the utility (regarding each characteristic and diﬀerent levels of privacy)
of the anonymized log when using diﬀerent target functions? In other terms, what is the
impact of diﬀerent target functions on the utility of the anonymization result?
Contributions Relying on the deﬁnition of (k,m)-Anonymity, we evaluate the impact of
the target function of the anonymization on the usefulness of the resulting search logs for
ad placement. We consider generic characteristics of the anonymized log like large log size,
retaining many users, as well as characteristics speciﬁc for advertisement, such as terms with
a high marketing value, terms leading to many ad impressions etc. Regarding these charac-
teristics, we measure how diﬀerent anonymized logs generated with diﬀerent target functions
are. We do so for diﬀerent levels of anonymity. As mentioned above, we have implemented a
heuristic algorithm to achieve (k,m)-Anonymity. Our implementation is ﬂexible regarding
the target function.
The real world search log we use for the evaluation includes 3.5 million queries of 370,585 us-
ers. To obtain real world marketing data as well we have crawled the Yahoo! marketing por-
tal. This portal oﬀers information to clients planning advertising campaigns like estimates
of the number of ad impressions or of clicks, or like the maximal bid recommended. We
have retrieved these values for all terms in the search log.
Our main results are that (k,m)-Anonymity prevents re-identiﬁcation similar to that in
the AOL case, while retaining information in the search log valuable for advertisement. For
instance, a real-world log anonymized for m = 3, k = 100 still contains terms leading to 61%
of the ad clicks, according to our estimates. Further, we show the importance of the target
function when anonymizing data for ad placement. For example, having the same level of
privacy (m = 3, k = 100) can lead to 40% less clicks with another target function.
Paper structure: We discuss background and related work in Sections 2 and 3. In
Section 4 we present our approach and evaluate it in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
In this section we will look at the data currently collected by search-engine providers (Sec-
tion 2.1) and the status quo of search-engine advertisement (Section 2.2). Further, we
describe the challenges of search-log anonymization in Section 2.3. Last, we introduce the
concept of set-valued anonymization and deﬁne (k,m)-Anonymity in Section 2.4.
2.1 Data Acquisition
Providers currently collect huge amounts of personal information. One important motivation
behind this is targeted ad placement. Microsoft, Google and Yahoo! all state exactly this
rationale in their relevant privacy policies1. A provider may obtain data from users who
are registered or from users who are not. In both cases this includes cookie information, IP
addresses, – this now is our topic – query terms, etc. Whereas anonymizing IP addresses is
relatively straightforward, e.g., masking out the lower bits, this is more diﬃcult with query
terms. Albeit with user consent, providers further collect name, zip code, gender, and birth
date from individuals with, e.g., a Windows Live ID or a Google account. Clearly, this data
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can be correlated with search logs. However, correlations of knowledge beyond the search
log exceed the scope of this paper.
One might expect that unregistered users have a higher expectation of privacy. Unfortu-
nately, this may not be the case; it is relatively easy to link queries in a sequence with high
probability based on time and IP as well as query terms [16]. Long search histories alone
may be an eﬀective user proﬁle [17] and are individually identiﬁable [1]. Google creates
search histories for unregistered users2, and building histories takes place by default.
Providers in turn face various obligations resulting from data-protection law when acquir-
ing and processing data. This becomes particularly complex, when the provider operates
internationally. Processing only anonymized data would reduce the need for functionality
required by law. For instance, a search-engine provider operating under European law would
not need to provide the means for users to revoke their consent they have given for use of
personalized proﬁles, delete data, consider storage limitation and limitations regarding the
correlation of the personal data with third party knowledge [4], etc.
2.2 Search-Engine Advertisement
In the very beginning, providers charged advertisers per impression. Today, advertisers
mostly pay per click on their ads. Thus, the key to search-engine advertisement is to show
those ads that are of interest to the user. To achieve this, providers oﬀer platforms where
advertisers can participate in ad-word auctions, e.g., Google AdWords3. The auction type
most widely used is the generalized second price auction [15,18]. Further, providers use
some additional criteria to decide which ad to show, e.g., if the page referred to in the ad
ﬁts the content of the ad. With pay-per-click, providers improve revenue by placing ads
matching the intent of the user, i.e., increase click probability. However, matching ads and
intentions is diﬃcult, as the following example shows.
Example 3: The query “Golf London” at www.google.co.uk returns ﬁve ads for golf courses,
one for golﬁng vacations, and two “generic” ads. Starting with the sequence of searches “compact
cars” and “corolla golf focus comparison” (with several clicks on car related results), the query “golf
london” brought up – the same golf course ads.
There obviously is room to improve estimating the user intent. The expectation behind
storing search histories is that the utilization of (a) nearby queries will lead to more eﬀective
ad placement, and (b) when queries do not contain good keywords, longer histories allow
ads of at least some interest to the query issuer based on past queries.
2.3 Challenges of Search Log Anonymization
Anonymizing search histories is diﬃcult. First, inherent to anonymization is the trade-oﬀ
between privacy and the quality of the data set after anonymization [13], such as usefulness
for ad placement. There are diﬀerent business models of providers, e.g., pay-per-click or
pay-per-impression, as well as diﬀerent advertising strategies, e.g., get many impressions
but few clicks only, few impressions but a high click rate, etc. [15]. Thus, providers and
advertisers tend to have diﬀerent interests. The provider is interested in a high revenue,
while the advertiser is interested in many impressions or clicks. It is unclear which target
function to use when it comes to anonymization.
2http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?answer=54048, Dec. 2009
3https://adwords.google.com
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Second, the party anonymizing the log has no a priori knowledge about which query term
or term combination is sensitive or might lead to an identiﬁcation. For instance, one cannot
readily use known techniques for health records. With health records, the party anonymizing
the log knows which values identify an individual, e.g., the attributes name or insurance
number; further, it knows which values are sensitive, e.g., the disease. Thus, commonly
known anonymization techniques for health data are not applicable [8–10,19].
Third, using generalization hierarchies, as done in [5,11], is hardly feasible for search logs,
since such hierarchies are not available for the search context with hundred thousands of
distinct terms. For example, a join of WordNet [20] with the Altavista search log removes
85% of distinct terms from the log.
Fourth, inserting queries into the log to disguise the user intent [12] seems to be another way
to achieve anonymity. However, this only prevents re-identiﬁcation if identifying terms from
one user are placed into logs of other users and are not distinguishable from the real queries
of that user. Further, this obviously makes placing ads in a personalized way impossible.
2.4 (k,m)-Anonymity
In this section we ﬁrst say why set-valued anonymization, i.e., (k,m)-Anonymity, ﬁts our sce-
nario. Next, we illustrate how to identify individuals in non-anonymized logs. We introduce
the deﬁnition of (k,m)-Anonymity and its relationship to the AOL case.
Deciding for (k,m)-Anonymity, instead of the variants of anonymity proposed in, e.g.,
[12,13,21,22], is due to the following observations and assumptions: First, when considering
search logs, one can observe that combinations of terms of diﬀerent queries of the same
user, not only combinations within the same query, threaten user privacy. Example 4 will
illustrate this. Further, we assume terms disclosed once may form a quasi-identiﬁer, as do
terms disclosed several times. For instance, a credit card number one can ﬁnd in many logs,
poses a similar threat when found once as when found several times. In other words, we
consider the privacy threat of a term to be independent from its frequency in the log. While
infrequent terms may be less indicative of individual preferences than frequent terms, and
thus less revealing if disclosed, our goal is to de-identify search logs and free providers of
the constraints of privacy law. The anonymized search log retains the structure of the orig-
inal log, but only including terms that meet the (k,m)-Anonymity standard; this provides
information such as term frequency for proﬁling while protecting against identifying the
individual associated with that proﬁle. In Section 5 we measure retention of both distinct
and total terms, as use of frequent terms may help to build a proﬁle of the (unidentiﬁed)
user to better support search and target advertising. Next, we cannot anticipate which
term combination will lead to an identiﬁcation or is sensitive. Accordingly, the deﬁnition of
(k,m)-Anonymity treats all terms in the same way, i.e., guarantees anonymity for any term
combination possible.
To illustrate the issues just raised, we will now look at the AOL disclosure of search logs [23].
Example 4: In 2006, AOL disclosed millions of queries including 454 queries with 356 distinct
terms of user 4417749. The log of this user contained searches for several individuals named ’Arnold’
as well as shops and landscapers in ’Lilburn’, ’Georgia’. 166 users other than user 4417749 had
searched for ’Arnold’, 5 others for ’Lilburn’ and 1379 others for ’Georgia’ (Table 1, m = 1). Thus,
this data set is (k,1) anonymous for k = 6. However, as can be seen in the table for m = 2, ’Arnold
& Lilburn’ in combination form a quasi identiﬁer, i.e., identify one person. This (and a phone book)
let reporters ﬁnd out that Thelma Arnold is user 4417749.
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term m frq.
Georgia 1 1380
Arnold 1 167
Lilburn 1 6
Arnold & Georgia 2 15
Lilburn & Georgia 2 5
Arnold & Lilburn 2 1
Arnold & Lilburn & Georgia 3 1
Table 1: re-identifying 4417749
As the example implies, we have to choose a deﬁnition of anonymity considering combi-
nations of terms. [5] has introduced the following deﬁnition for the market-basket scenario.
We have slightly modiﬁed it for search logs.
Deﬁnition 1 ((k,m)-Anonymity). A search log is (k,m)-anonymous if any combination of
m or fewer terms out of the history of a user appears in at least k − 1 histories of other
users. Further, we say that (k,m) is the level of privacy of the search log.
Looking at the frequency of term combinations of Example 4 implies that ’Arnold & Lil-
burn’ form a quasi-identiﬁer, for combinations of length m = 2 already, i.e., the AOL search
log is not anonymous for m > 1. (k,m)-Anonymity would have assured that this combi-
nation exists at least k times, i.e., for k = 2, m = 2, Thelma Arnold would not have been
identiﬁed.
Note that k and m are independent. However, if a search log is anonymous regarding
(k,m), it is for (k − 1,m) as well. The same holds for the parameter m, i.e., a log that is
(k,m)-anonymous is (k,m − 1)-anonymous.
3 Related Work
We now give an overview of anonymization techniques, with a focus on search logs.
Many existing techniques require a priori knowledge about which attributes are sensi-
tive, i.e., threaten the privacy of the individual. In health contexts, for instance, there are
attributes potentially identifying an individual, like ’name’ or ’insurance id’, and sensitive
attributes, like ’disease’. Prominent examples of anonymization techniques where identifying
attributes can clearly be distinguished from sensitive ones are k-anonymity [8], l-diversity [9],
t-closeness [10] and anatomy [24]. These approaches leave the sensitive attribute untouched,
however, they (mostly) generalize the identifying attributes, here given by an insurance code
<68766, diabetes>, <68799, cancer> to <687**, diabetes>, <687**, cancer>. Thus, for
this 2-anonymous example, an adversary cannot allot the disease to one individual.
With search logs, any term combination can be sensitive as well as identifying. [17] demon-
strates how to map sequences of queries to the gender, age, and location of the issuer. Such
a mapping reduces the set of potential issuers by a factor of 300–600, compared to random
selection.
Anonymization techniques speciﬁc to search logs exist. [13] proposes a two-step approach:
The ﬁrst one is to remove infrequent queries. The second one is to create for each topic a
user has searched for a virtual identity. Afterwards, depending on the topic, the authors
assign each query of that user to the corresponding virtual identity. To illustrate the second
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step, they distinguish between queries of user u regarding, say, soccer, and those regarding
cooking. Then they assign the queries to virtual user u1 for soccer and to u2 for cooking.
However, the ﬁrst step removes 97% of the distinct queries and 64% of the log size – a
signiﬁcant loss. Further, distributing queries among several users reduces the usefulness of
the log, e.g., for ad placement. [21] analyzes another approach called ’token-based hashing’
and shows its ineﬀectiveness as an anonymization technique. [22] studies the release of query
click graphs where nodes are both queries and urls and edges correspond to clicks on URLs
based on a query issued. They deﬁne a query to be anonymous if the frequency plus some
noise is above a predeﬁned threshold.
[5,11] are most closely related to our work. They do without the assumption that one knows
which attributes are identifying or sensitive. [5] is ﬁrst to state the problem and to propose
the solution of anonymization of set-valued data, for market-basket analysis. Attacks may
be successful if the attacker knows some products purchased. To cope with this privacy
threat, they propose (k,m)-Anonymity (Section 2.4). Next, they propose three algorithms,
all based on generalization. However, they only consider short transaction logs (2k–15k) and
item domains of a size of 40. Search logs tend to consist of several millions of queries and
more than 300k distinct terms. Further, [5] requires a generalization hierarchy. For instance,
a term like ’bread’ is replaced by the more general term ’food’ if ’bread’ is infrequent. This
is not practical for search logs. Last, their algorithms feature global recoding, i.e., when a
term is generalized, this takes place for all of its occurrences.
[11] is an extension of [5]. Based on the same deﬁnition of anonymity, they tackle the
problem of ﬁnding an appropriate m by applying k-anonymity to entire queries. In other
words, they look at (k,m)-Anonymity for m = max(transaction-size). They also generalize
data and propose an algorithm. They use a top-down approach instead of a bottom-up
approach and use local recoding, as we do. They show that their algorithm generalizes
terms more eﬃciently than [5]. They also apply their approach to query logs. However,
in lieu of a real term hierarchy, they simply use an alphabetically ordered generalization
tree and a tree with generalization using the limited number of nouns from WordNet. They
themselves state that using WordNet is ’by no means a perfect approach’, as many popular
made-up words, names and terms like ’myspace’, ’amazon’, and ’facebook’ are missing.
Related work described analyzes the anonymization result based on generic characteristics,
e.g., log size. We in turn are ﬁrst giving a comprehensive utility analysis with realistic
marketing and search data. Our approach deletes terms, and we do so locally for the
history of each user. Due to the reasons mentioned above we cannot deploy the algorithms
from [5,11] in our context and cannot compare our algorithm to them.
4 Approach
In this section we ﬁrst describe target functions relevant in the advertisement context (Sec-
tion 4.1). Next, we give the problem statement (Section 4.3) and the realization of our
approach (Section 4.4).
4.1 Information Loss and Usability
We now describe diﬀerent target functions. We have derived the ones speciﬁc for adver-
tisement by analyzing the Yahoo! marketing platform, i.e., information Yahoo! oﬀers to
advertisers to optimize their campaigns.
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term frequency users max bid ($) ad impressions clicks revenue ($)
or 142041 2170 0.42 56574 28 12
com 74453 31974 0.69 203681 549 380
MacMall 4 4 919 5775 786 722334
ATT 270 146 0.5 5009356 3747 1874
Lowes 173 101 0.05 491515 211489 10575
AdultFriendFinder 6 3 334 10020 2742 915828
Table 2: Illustration of Utility Criteria
# distinct terms. Providers may want to keep a maximum number of distinct terms in
the anonymized log to understand the interests and intentions of their users well. Further,
this objective gives way to broad advertisement.
log size. Providers may want to keep a log ﬁle of maximum size, e.g., prefer frequent
occurrences of a term over distinct, but infrequent terms. This could be of interest in the
case of several advertisers willing to place ads on the same (frequent) term.
# users. Deleting terms from the history can eliminate all terms of a user. Providers may
want to have some information on many (non-identiﬁable) users, even if it is vague.
bid. Most providers are paid per ad click. Thus, they may want to keep those terms
advertisers issue high bids for. We calculate the utility as bid · term frequency, i.e., weight
bid with the term frequency. We will do so for the following target functions as well.
estimated clicks. Depending on the business model (pay-per click) providers might prefer
having ads clicked frequently over terms with high bids but only few ad clicks.
ad impressions. An alternative business model is pay-per ad impression. Impressions
means how often a speciﬁc ad is shown, independently from being clicked.
revenue. This criterion keeps those terms in the logs where
P
term clicks(term) · bid(term)
is maximal.
Example 5: For the search log we will use in the evaluation, Table 2 lists the term with the
highest frequency, the one most users have issued, the one whose bid recommended is maximal
and the one whose expected number of impressions/clicks/revenue is maximal. The two highest
frequency terms (or and com) are not very interesting, and would often be considered candidates
for a stopword list.
Note that frequent terms may be of low value, but are also unlikely to be identifying. We do
not make such an apriori judgement, leaving it instead to the target function. Thus, diﬀerent
criteria lead to diﬀerent rankings of the terms and thus inﬂuence the anonymization.
In fact, ’bids’ and ’revenue’ as introduced do not represent the real revenue of the provider.
This is because providers mostly use second price auctions (or related), place several ads in
parallel etc. However, to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study assigning to an anonymized
log real-world marketing data as indicators for its value for ad placement.
4.2 Correlation Analysis
So far, we have identiﬁed relevant characteristics of anonymized search logs, i.e., character-
istics one might target on during anonymization. To answer our research question regarding
the impact of the target function, it may be insightful to analyze the characteristics of the
input data, i.e., of search logs and marketing data.
Example 6: Consider again Example 2: A term that is frequent is not necessarily one Yahoo!
recommends high bids for. When trying to keep frequent terms during anonymization, this does
not mean that the resulting log will contain many expensive terms. On the other hand, suppose
that those two criteria were highly correlated. In this case, it would not make much of a diﬀerence
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revenue impressions clicks max bid user frq.
term frq. corr. .002 .111* .024* .001 .761*
sig .326 .000 .000 .348 .000
N 64,694 117,916 64,694 117,916 117,916
user frq. corr. .003 .151* .031* .002
sig .259 .000 .000 .254
N 64,694 117,916 64,694 117,916
max bid corr. .579* .002 -.003
sig .000 .296 .225
N 64,694 117,916 64,694
clicks corr. .040* .400*
sig .000 .000
N 64,694 64,694
impressions corr. .020*
sig .000
N 64,694
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Analysis of Input Data
which target function to use during anonymization: The anonymization result would contain both
many frequent and many expensive terms.
We compute the pairwise correlation between all relevant characteristics we have identiﬁed
in Section 4.1, i.e., for each term we compare the number of users having used the term to
the maximal bid Yahoo! recommends, to the frequency of the term, etc. Table 3 shows the
Pearson correlation, the signiﬁcance of the correlation, and the number of terms used for the
correlation analysis (N) for each combination. As Yahoo! gives no estimate of the number
of clicks for 45% of the terms, correlations including the variable clicks have a smaller N.
Results marked with ’*’ are signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). For 9 combinations we
see a signiﬁcant correlation, for 6 combinations in turn we do not ﬁnd a correlation. All
combinations except one (clicks, max bid) have a positive correlation. Thus, we expect that
in many cases targeting at one variable when anonymizing the log will have positive eﬀects
on the other characteristics as well. However, this strongly depends on the variable. For
instance, for ’max bid’ the only signiﬁcant correlation is with the variable ’revenue’. This is
not surprising since ’max bid’ is the calculation basis for ’revenue’. The variable ’clicks’ in
turn correlates with four others. We will analyze the implications of the correlations on the
anonymized log in Section 5.3.
We will focus on the utility of the anonymized log. However, as we know from [10], knowing
the distribution of sensitive information within a data set, e.g., computed by correlation
analyses as we have done here, might lead to privacy threats as well. It is an open question
how to handle this in the context of set-valued anonymization. This is not the focus of the
current article – we look at the level of privacy deﬁned by k and m only.
4.3 Formal Problem Statement
It is an open question if an anonymized search log is of value for ad placement/marketing
purposes. To obtain a (k,m)-anonymous log S′ from an initial log S, we delete terms from
the query histories of the users, as we will explain. The log S is a set of search histories
of the users. Here, a history is the set of terms of queries a user has issued. The choice
Transactions on Data Privacy 4 (2011)40 Thorben Burghardt, Klemens B¨ ohm, Achim Guttmann, Chris Clifton
of the term to delete from the history of user i (H i) is crucial and depends on the target
function (ta). A target function takes a set of terms and returns the term to delete that has
the lowest utility regarding ta. As there are diﬀerent target functions, there can be diﬀerent
anonymized variants S′ of a log S with the same level of privacy. In what follows, Uta is
the utility of the anonymized log. It is the sum of the utilities (with respect to the target
function considered) of each term in the anonymized log S′.
Example 7: Think of a search log S with three users and individual histories H 1 = {a,b,c},
H 2 = {a,b,d}, and H 3 = {b,c,d}. a,...,d are terms. ta, here, targets at terms with high bids.
Let m = 2, k = 2 be the requested level of anonymity. We can see that H 1
′ = H 2
′ = {a,b} and
H 3
′ = {b} is (2,2) anonymous, as is H 1
′ = H 3
′ = {b,c} and H 2
′ = {b}. However, if advertisers
bid highly for a and not for c, the ﬁrst variant would have a higher utility.
Problem statement: Given diﬀerent levels of privacy and diﬀerent target functions ta and
ta∗, is there a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the utility of the log anonymized using ta and
the one using ta∗? In other terms, what is the impact of diﬀerent target functions on the
utility of the anonymization result?
We can expect the best utility with respect to a target taφ (Utaφ) when using the target
function taφ in our anonymization algorithm, and not another one. However, it is important
to notice that greedy heuristics do not necessarily lead to the optimal result.
Example 8: We now extend Example 7 with a fourth history H 4={a,c,e}. Then, H 1’={c},
H 2’= {b,d}, H 3’={b,d} and H 4’={c} form a (2,2) anonymous log (S’), as do H 1”={a,b,c},
H 2”={a,b}, H 3”={b,c} and H 4”={a,c}, subsequently referred to as S”. Suppose that the utility
of a term is u = bid · clicks, and ua=$1, ub=$1.1, uc=$1.2, ud=$1.3, ue=$1.4. For the ﬁrst variant
S’, we have removed a instead of d, and a instead of b, as a has the lowest utility compared to
all others. Thus, the ﬁrst variant has utility Ubid∗click(S
′) = $7.2. In the second variant we have
removed d, which has a high utility. However, this results in Ubid∗click(S
′′) =$9.9, i.e., a higher
overall utility.
4.4 (k,m)-Anonymity Algorithm
In this section we describe our anonymization algorithm, which is heuristic in nature. It
is diﬀerent from existing ones which are not applicable for search logs (cf. Section 2.3).
However, existing algorithms could be adapted to work in our context as well without
diﬃculty, and we do not claim the algorithm is a signiﬁcant contribution.
In our algorithm (Algorithm 1) S is the search log, Hi is the history of user i, and S =
S
Hi.
|N| is the number of users. fis is the set of all term combinations that are frequent, i.e.,
that have occurred in queries issued by k users. List Ci contains all combinations of terms
in Hi of a maximal size m. Building term combinations of size smaller than m is due to our
assumption that privacy protection is optimal if the entire history of a user exists k times.
Thus, if there is a history of size smaller than m, we keep it in the log if the terms appear
in at least k − 1 other histories. This only ensures (k,‘size of history’)-Anonymity for this
user. cij stands for the j-th combination in Ci. We denote set-valued assignments by ⇐.
Example 9: Continuing Example 7 with k = 2 and m = 2, fis would contain {a,b}, C1 is
[{a,b},{a,c},{b,c}], c1,1 is {a,b}.
Initially, we use the fp-growth implementation of [25] to ﬁnd frequent combinations of terms
(Line 3). The next step is to create for each user ni ∈ N all possible combinations of terms
of size m using only terms in Hi and all subsets of it. Afterwards, we test for each of these
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Algorithm 1 (k,m)-Anonymity - Greedy Heuristic
1: S ⇐ Original search log, S′ ⇐ {};
2: N := Total number of users, k,m := anonymity parameters from Deﬁnition 1
3: fis := fpgrowth();
4: while S != S′ do
5: S′ ⇐ S
6: for i = 1 to |N| do
7: Hi ⇐ all Terms of user ni
8: Ci ⇐ combinations of terms in Hi of size ≤ m
9: for j = 1 to |Ci| do
10: cij := Ci[j]
11: if support(fis,cij) < k then
12: r := target fct(cij,ta)
13: Hi ⇐ Hi \ r
14: fis ⇐ update fis(Hi)
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: S ⇐
S
Hi
19: end while
iteration term m frequency state
1. eugene 3 4 keep term
1. chicago 3 2 candidate
1. smith 3 2 candidate
2. chicago 2 4 candidate
2. smith 2 4 candidate
3. chicago 1 6 keep term
3. smith 1 4 delete term
Table 4: Deciding for a term to delete
combinations if they are element of fis, the set of frequent term combinations. If this is the
case with a speciﬁc term combination, it is (k,m)-anonymous. However, if support(cij) < k
we have to delete one term in the combination from Hi.
Our heuristic is greedy in the sense that it deletes the term that ﬁts the target function in
the currently best way. We compute the term to delete in Line 12, by function target fct.
target fct can behave in three diﬀerent manners, namely ’random’, ’ﬁs’, and focusing on
the generic/speciﬁc target functions. The ﬁrst alternative, ’random’, means that a term
to remove from cij is chosen randomly. We use this as the baseline when evaluating the
diﬀerent target functions. The second alternative ’ﬁs’ is to operate on frequent itemsets
only. This behavior is most related to existing work on set-valued data. We delete the term
that is part of the fewest term combinations in fis. If more than one term has minimal
frequency, we look at the frequency of these terms for m′ = m − 1. We repeat this until
there is only one term with the minimal frequency, or k = 0. In the latter case we randomly
choose one of the remaining terms.
Example 10: Suppose that there is the combination of terms {eugene, chicago, smith} / ∈ fis
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as given in Table 4. Thus, we have to delete one of these terms. We calculate how often each term
occurs in the frequent item set. Here ’eugene’ appears 4 times, ’chicago’ and ’smith’ both two times
(Column ’frequency’). Accordingly, we keep ’eugene’ and delete one of the remaining terms. We
decrease m, and, again, ’chicago’ and ’smith’ both occur equally often (four times). We decrease m
once more. ’smith’ is rarer, i.e., will be deleted.
Algorithm 2 target fct(c,ta)
1: c := term combination of size m
2: v ⇐ {}; /*term utility*/
3: for i = 1 to m do
4: v ⇐ get term utility(i, ta);
5: end for
6: return return a random element with utility = v.min();
Finally, Algorithm 2 describes the third alternative. Here, the utility of a term is according
to the target function ta. We return the term whose utility is minimal (Line 6) with respect
to ta. If two or more terms have the same utility, we pick one randomly. Our implementation
supports ta ∈{random, logsize, users, bid, clicks, impressions revenue}.
Having deleted a term, we have to update fis (Alg. 1, Line 14), i.e., we decrease the support
of all combinations containing this term. It is important that only those combinations must
be considered that one can build by combining terms t ∈ Hi. The combinations of terms
with new support ≤ k are deleted from fis.
Our algorithm processes one user after another. Thus, removing terms and (former) fre-
quent term combinations can aﬀect histories of users already processed. So we apply our
heuristic repeatedly until no more terms need to be deleted.
5 Evaluation
In this section we answer our research question. We ﬁrst describe the data we use in the eval-
uation (Section 5.1). Next, even though eﬃciency of our heuristic is not our primary focus,
we give an intuition on the runtime behavior of our algorithm (Section 5.2). We detail the
measures used to study the usefulness of anonymized logs for advertisement (Section 5.3).
We present results comparing diﬀerent target functions and values of k in Section 5.4. Sec-
tion 5.5 focuses on the impact of the parameter m, i.e., the size of the term combinations
deemed potentially identifying.
5.1 Search and Marketing Data
In this section we brieﬂy introduce the data used in our evaluation, namely the search log
from Altavista and the marketing data from Yahoo!.
Altavista Log. The Altavista search log was published in 2002, covering one day of
queries4. It contains 3.5 million queries of 370,585 users. The log is of the form Q=〈user id,
query, timestamp〉. We have applied the following preprocessing steps: (i) Our objec-
tive is to anonymize personally identiﬁable information, not data from metasearch engines,
crawlers etc. If an adversary can identify such a service in an anonymized log, this would
4Altavista transaction logs from 2002, provided by Jim Jansen (jjansen@acm.org)
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reduce the indistinguishability of k by one, with every service identiﬁed. Thus, we have
removed queries issued by bots according to the (simplistic) method from [26] by removing
users with sessions containing more than 100 queries. (ii) We treat all characters except
[A-Za-z0-9` A-Ö` U-´ Yß-öù-ˇ z] as whitespace. For example, the two queries ‘ad–placement’ and
‘ad placement’ only diﬀer in one special character and are normalized to be the same term
sequence. (iii) Privacy threats can result from combining terms of diﬀerent queries of the
same person. We extract the terms from each query and store the result in a relation with
schema QT=〈user id, query id, term id〉. Our preprocessing leads to 1,846,134 queries
of 367,803 users with 251,115 distinct terms and 5,501,825 occurrences of these terms. Note
that the number of terms is above the size of any conventional dictionary, e.g., English or
German, due to names (‘myspace’), error codes (‘oraXXXX’), etc.
Yahoo! Search Marketing Data. We are interested in the value of anonymized log
data for advertisement. To this end, we assign a value to each term. The Yahoo! marketing
site5 provides estimates for (i) the number of impressions of an ad for a given term, (ii)
the number of times the ad will be clicked, and (iii) the maximum max bid Yahoo! recom-
mends advertisers use for the term (based on a given total budget). We have crawled the
site and collected this marketing information for the approximately 250,000 distinct terms
contained in the Altavista search log.
5.2 Runtime Behavior
Our focus is to compare the impact of diﬀerent target functions rather than achieving an
optimal computation time. Accordingly, the following evaluation will give an intuition on the
runtime behavior of our algorithm for diﬀerent k and m. For the reasons already described,
we will not compare it to other algorithms.
We use standard hardware (Dual-Core AMD Opteron 2218), 8GB RAM, Java, and a single
threaded implementation. Further, we use a relational database to store the search histories
during the anonymization process, e.g., we track each deletion of a term required for any
target function, each level of privacy and iteration of the algorithm. The interaction with
the database has the most signiﬁcant impact on the runtime behavior.
Comparing the time required for the computation of the anonymized log and each target
function shows that the target function requiring the most computation time is operating
on frequent term combinations only (the second case in Section 4.4). The time for the worst
case, i.e., small k, is particularly interesting. The larger k, the smaller the vocabulary and,
thus, the time needed.
The ﬁrst iteration for each k requires to delete a large number of infrequent terms and term
combinations. Accordingly, the ﬁrst iteration requires most time, e.g., for k = 2 02h:55m:58s.
With the second iteration, the time already drops to 09m:25s, i.e., a factor of around 17.
For k > 2, the time for the ﬁrst iteration is signiﬁcantly reduced, e.g., to 7m:41s for k = 5.
For m = 2, the average time per iteration is 4 minutes, the average number of iterations 6.7.
In qualitative terms, this observation also holds for (k,3)-Anonymity. Nevertheless, with
90h:08m:24s for k = 2 when starting from the initial log ﬁle, the ﬁrst iteration is signiﬁcantly
more cost intensive than for m = 2 (factor 31). This is due to the number of possible term
combinations. For example, the largest Ti contains 495 terms. According to Algorithm 1,
we have to test
￿493
3
￿
+
￿493
2
￿
+
￿493
1
￿
= 19,970,937 combinations to be frequent for this user
5http://sem.smallbusiness.yahoo.com/searchenginemarketing/marketingcost.php
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m k dist. terms % logsize % users % bid % clicks % impressions % revenue %
2
2 10.88 45 95 51 85 85 61
10 2.12 29 87 33 75 71 41
20 1.09 26 83 29 71 67 36
40 0.56 23 78 25 68 63 33
100 0.18 19 70 20 61 58 27
3
2 10.86 37 95 42 78 76 55
10 2.12 25 87 31 71 67 43
20 1.11 23 83 28 68 64 39
40 0.56 21 78 24 65 62 35
100 0.18 18 70 19 61 57 30
Table 5: Quality of anonymized search log
only. However, starting from (2,2)-Anonymity, we can calculate (2,3)-Anonymity within
06h:35m:22s, i.e., in 7% of the time required. Again, for k > 2, the duration of the ﬁrst
iteration is reduced. For k = 5 the ﬁrst iteration lasts 48m:45s. The average time per
iteration has been 13 minutes with 4.8 iterations on average.
5.3 Usability for Ad Placement
In this section we will ﬁrst quantify generic characteristics of the anonymized log, i.e., the
number of distinct terms in it, its size, and the number of users with queries remaining.
Afterwards, we focus on the characteristics speciﬁc for advertisement, namely the maximal
bid Yahoo! recommends, the number of clicks, the number of ad impressions estimated and
potential revenue. Note that we have speciﬁc target functions for log size, the users with
anonymous queries remaining, bid, clicks, impressions and revenue. For each target function,
in combination with values m = 2 and m = 3, and samples of k between 2 and 100, we
compute the anonymized log. Table 5 shows the impact of anonymization in percent.
In all cases, each target function also leads to the best result with respect to its focus. For
example, targeting on the log size also leads to the largest log compared to all other target
functions. We do not have a target function for the number of distinct terms, i.e., here, we
only present the best outcome of any target function. Our results are given in Table 5. The
upper half are results for m = 2, k = 2,10,20,40,100, the lower half the ones for m = 3.
distinct terms. Column ‘dist. terms’ shows that even for the lowest level of anonymity,
i.e., m = 2, k = 2, the number of distinct terms is signiﬁcantly reduced, to only 10.88%. For
the highest level of anonymity (m = 3, k = 100), only 0.18% distinct terms remain in the
anonymized log. The major reason for this is the long tail eﬀect of search logs, i.e., there are
many terms that are infrequent and few that are frequent. However, there still are about
500 distinct terms, allowing for a relatively broad set of ad topics.
log size. With m = 2, k = 2 there is a signiﬁcant drop oﬀ of the log size, compared to the
initial size (55%). This, again, is due to the long tail eﬀect of search logs. For m = 2, k = 20,
we maintain 26% of the log size, for m = 3, k = 100 this is 18%. This result means that,
even if we can keep only between 11% and 0.18% of distinct terms, the remaining terms are
frequently used, i.e., terms an advertiser might be interested in as well.
# users. Independently of m, and for small k, the anomymization result contains histories
for 95% of the users, 5% of the users ‘are lost’, as we delete their entire histories to achieve
(k,m)-Anonymity. Even for large k, e.g., k = 100, we maintain some data for 70% of all
users. We deem these numbers promising to derive general interests of the users.
Next to the generic measures we apply measures speciﬁc for the advertisement context.
bid. Our results (Column ‘bid’) show that after the anonymization for m = 2, k = 2 the
sum of the bids for terms included in the anonymized log still is 51%, compared to the
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m k dist. terms % users % logsize %
R W ﬁs R W ﬁs R W ﬁs
2
2 0.00 4.16 4.08 13 2 0 2 0 0
10 0.00 0.92 0.90 11 2 0 12 1 0
20 0.00 0.40 0.39 11 2 1 17 1 0
40 0.00 0.16 0.15 11 2 1 21 2 0
100 0.00 0.00 0.14 11 2 1 28 2 0
3
2 0.00 4.18 4.07 10 3 0 2 0 0
10 0.00 0.88 0.77 10 2 0 12 1 0
20 0.00 0.31 0.27 10 2 1 17 1 0
40 0.00 0.16 0.14 10 2 1 21 2 0
100 0.00 0.02 0.00 10 2 1 28 2 0
Table 6: Impact of generic target functions
m k bid % clicks % impressions % revenue %
R W ﬁs R W ﬁs R W ﬁs R W ﬁs
2
2 20 13 12 28 15 8 31 9 6 20 5 5
10 17 13 11 34 28 13 32 14 8 16 5 5
20 16 12 11 35 33 15 32 15 9 16 5 5
40 14 11 9 38 36 18 31 16 9 15 5 5
100 13 9 7 37 37 19 30 16 10 15 5 5
3
2 15 14 11 32 31 12 29 16 7 21 12 10
10 16 14 11 39 40 21 34 19 11 22 12 12
20 15 13 11 40 41 24 34 19 12 21 12 12
40 14 11 9 40 41 25 33 20 12 19 11 11
100 13 9 7 39 40 25 32 19 12 19 10 10
Table 7: Impact of speciﬁc target functions
original one. For m = 3, k = 100 it is still 20%.
clicks. For large k = 100 and m = 3, the terms still in the log account for 61% of the clicks
estimated. For m = 2, k = 2, the rate even is 85%.
impressions. Our results (Column ‘impressions’) are very similar to those for clicks. We
can maintain those terms in the log leading to 57% to 85% of all ad impressions, depending
on the level of privacy.
revenue.The revenue combines the bid of the advertiser, the number of clicks and the term
frequency. Our results (Column ‘revenue’) are that revenues vary between 30% and 61%,
again depending on the level of privacy.
5.4 Impact of the Target Functions
In this section we compare the diﬀerent target functions. Table 6 contains our results for
the number of distinct terms, log size and users, i.e., the generic target functions. Table 7
gives the results for the bid recommended, estimated clicks, ad impressions and revenue,
i.e., our speciﬁc target functions. Again, we give results relative to the original log. For each
measure, we give the diﬀerence of the best result achieved compared to random (Column
‘R’), to the worst target function other than random (‘W’) and to that function working on
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Figure 2: estimated clicks per target function
frequent term combination only (fis). Random is the average of two runs.
Our ﬁrst result is that, for the generic characteristics ‘log size’, ‘distinct terms’ and ‘number
of remaining users in the anonymized log’, the diﬀerence between the best target function
and the worst one is less than 4.2% in all cases. Figure 1 shows the resulting log size for
the diﬀerent target functions and m = 3, k = 2...100, to give an example. Compared to
random, the diﬀerence of the log of up to 28% is relatively high. Thus, even though the
impact of the target function is relatively small for the generic characteristics, it clearly is
diﬀerent from random. Targeting on many users also leads to the second largest log size.
This is due to the high correlation between the users having searched for a term and the
frequency of the term (.761, Table 3).
Our second result is that, for those characteristics speciﬁc to advertisement, the diﬀerence
between the best and the worst target function is signiﬁcant. For example, for the number
of clicks estimated (Figure 2), the best target function (clicks) and the worst one (bids)
have a diﬀerence of more than 40%. The reason for this large gap is that clicks and max
bid are the only variables having (even if not signiﬁcant) a negative correlation (Table 3).
Interestingly, for the distinct terms for which we do not have a speciﬁc target function,
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randomly deleting terms outperforms all others. Thus, the target function has a signiﬁcant
impact on the usefulness of the anonymized log.
5.5 Impact of the Term-Combinations Size
An important decision for the party anonymizing the log is the choice of the value of m,
i.e., the size of the term combinations potentially leading to a re-identiﬁcation. Recall that
m = 2 would have prevented the re-identiﬁcation in the AOL example (Section 2.4). We
have evaluated our results for m = 3 as well. Surprisingly, the eﬀect of m is minimal,
compared to that of k. For k ≥ 10, the diﬀerence of the outcomes for any target function
and m = 2 and m = 3 is less than 4%. For k = 100 the values are mostly equal. This
observation also holds for the diﬀerent target functions. For the generic ones, the diﬀerences
are under 1% in all cases. The largest diﬀerence of at most 7% is for revenue. We conclude
that, for large k, a value of m < 3 would yield an unnecessarily low level of anonymity,
without increasing the usefulness of the log.
5.6 Discussion
We have shown in some detail the impact of changing the anonymity factor k. We have also
shown that for small values of m, changes have little impact. But what about other factors?
History size: The length of history we use to proﬁle a user can be varied. While increasing
the number of queries used to determine user interests could improve ad placement, it also
results in more possible term combinations. This is not only a computational issue, it can
reduce the terms kept. For example, suppose several users have issued queries for a and b;
and several other users have issued queries for c and d. A query history containing {a,b,c,d}
would be able to keep only {a,b} or {c,d}, as no combination involving both a and c, a
and d, b and c, or c and d is frequent. But if that user’s history was split into two (and the
linkage between the two eliminated), the ﬁrst {a,b} and the second {c,d}, both could be
kept in their entirety.
However, the number of combinations that are frequent would drop as well (given the
shorter histories), so it is also possible that the suppression could increase.
Log size: Increasing the overall log size increases the number of frequent term combina-
tions, although at some expense to run time. A more important issue is that some term
combinations may be frequent in a narrow time range (e.g., names of candidates during an
election); searching for those same terms at a diﬀerent time may be highly identifying even
though the (k,m)-anonymity deﬁnition is met globally. We therefore believe that the log
size should be somewhat limited, and anonymization performed across a limited time (and
possibly geographic) range, to ensure privacy protection.
k: Increasing k forces more terms to be deleted. This has a positive eﬀect on the runtime
behavior, as our algorithm has to test fewer term combinations. The eﬀect on the utility
of the anonymized log is negative. However, the long-tail eﬀect inherent to search logs will
cushion this, i.e., the impact of each increase in k is less than the previous increase.
m: While increasing m reduces the possibility of re-identiﬁcation, it will force our algorithm
to delete more terms (aﬀecting utility). We have seen that for small values of m, this eﬀect
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is not that great – and examples of re-identiﬁcation we have seen are prevented with small
values of m. With the algorithm presented here, particularly Lines 8 and 11, and histories
that are large, high m lead to hundred millions of tests for the frequency of term combinations
(
￿Ti
m
￿
+
￿ Ti
m−1
￿
+...+
￿Ti
1
￿
) . As m increases, the result becomes closer to standard k-anonymity
(which we have shown results in very high levels of suppression). Eﬃcient algorithms for
optimizing to a particular utility target with higher values of m remains an open challenge.
5.7 Summary
We have shown that, even though the number of distinct terms is quite small after ano-
nymization, the remaining frequent terms lead to a log size between 18% and 45% of the
original, depending on the level of anonymization. More importantly, the number of users
remaining in the log is quite high. Further, the large share of clicks and ad impressions that
are still feasible with the anonymized log (between 57% and 85%) is promising.
6 Conclusions
Targeted advertising is the primary source of revenue of search engines. Further reﬁnements
of ad placement are likely to rely on individually identiﬁable data. However, storing such
data puts user privacy at risk, and its use by search engines raises various compliance issues.
We have shown that, by means of anonymization, search engines can avoid using individually
identiﬁable information for ad placement while still maintaining high eﬀectiveness.
In this work we make use of the notion of (k,m)-Anonymity for set-valued data. We have
implemented an algorithm that is ﬂexible regarding the target function, e.g., to retain a
large log size, to retain a log with terms leading to many ad clicks etc. With extensive
evaluations on real world data we have shown that anonymized search logs contain valuable
information for providers and advertisers. For instance, anonymization retains data of 70%
to 95% of all users, depending on the level of anonymization. We can retain 61% to 85% of
these clicks, based on retaining keywords with high click rate expectations, given the data
available from Yahoo!. Choosing m = 2 or m = 3 turns out to have only a small impact.
Further, the target functions are important. For instance, with a target function poorly
chosen, the number of clicks on an ad may be 40% lower than necessary.
Thus, to preserve user privacy and free search-engine providers from compliance issues,
anonymized logs to improve advertising could be a feasible approach.
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